Perearstiabi tulemuslikkus: tasustamise ja praksisetegurite mõju by Merilind, Eero
1
Tartu 2016
ISSN 1024-395X
ISBN 978-9949-77-204-9 
EERO
 M
ER
ILIN
D
 
Prim
ary health care perform
ance: im
pact of paym
ent and practice-based characteristics
EERO MERILIND
Primary health care performance:
impact of payment and
practice-based characteristics
DISSERTATIONES 
MEDICINAE 
UNIVERSITATIS 
TARTUENSIS
246
DISSERTATIONES MEDICINAE UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
246 
 
 
 
  
DISSERTATIONES MEDICINAE UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EERO MERILIND 
 
Primary health care performance:  
impact of payment and  
practice-based characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Family Medicine and Public Health University of Tartu Estonia 
 
This dissertation is accepted for the commencement of the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (Medicine) on May 18th, 2016 by the Council of the Faculty of 
Medicine, University of Tartu, Estonia. 
 
Supervisor:  Professor Ruth Kalda, MD, Dr Med Sci 
 Institute of Family Medicine and Public Health,  
University of Tartu, Estonia 
 
Reviewers: Kaja Põlluste, MD, PhD 
 Senior researcher, Institute of Clinical Medicine,  
University of Tartu, Estonia 
 
 Mati Rahu, PhD 
 Lead researcher, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, 
National Institute for Health Development, Tallinn, Estonia 
 
Opponent:  Professor Igor Švab, MD, PhD, Department of Family Medicine, 
 Vice-dean, Faculty of Medicine, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia 
 
Commencement: September 12th, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1024-395X 
ISBN 978-9949-77-204-9 (print) 
ISBN 978-9949-77-205-6 (pdf) 
 
 
Copyright: Eero Merilind, 2016 
 
University of Tartu Press 
www.tyk.ee 
5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS  ......................................................  7 
ABBREVIATIONS  .......................................................................................  8 
1. INTRODUCTION  .....................................................................................   9 
2. ESTONIAN CONTEXT  ...........................................................................  11 
2.1. Primary healthcare system  .................................................................  11 
2.2. Payment schemes in primary health care  ...........................................  12 
2.3. Payment for performance  ...................................................................  14 
3. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  ...........................................................  16 
3.1. Primary health care  ............................................................................  16 
3.2. Different payment models of primary care  ........................................   16 
3.3. Definitions of quality  .........................................................................  17 
3.4. Quality indicators (QI)  .......................................................................  18 
3.5. QI – process or health outcome targets?  ............................................  19 
3.6. QI and financial incentives  for improving the quality  ......................  19 
3.7. Different types of incentive models  for funders of health services  ...  21 
3.8. P4P in different countries  ...................................................................  21 
3.8.1. Australia  ...................................................................................  22 
3.8.2. Canada  ......................................................................................  22 
3.8.3. Italy  ..........................................................................................  22 
3.8.4. Spain  ........................................................................................  22 
3.8.5. United Kingdom  .......................................................................  23 
3.8.6. United States  ............................................................................  23 
3.9. Effects of P4P  .....................................................................................  24 
3.9.1. Family doctors workload  ..........................................................  25 
3.9.2. Specialist consultations and hospitalisations  ............................  25 
3.9.3. Prevention   ...............................................................................  26 
3.9.4. Management of chronic diseases  .............................................  27 
3.10. Who should be rewarded in P4P?  ....................................................  28 
4. STUDY RATIONALE  ..............................................................................  30 
5. AIMS OF THE STUDY  ............................................................................  31 
6. SUBJECTS AND METHODS  ..................................................................  32 
6.1. Study design  .......................................................................................  32 
6.2. Data sources  .......................................................................................  33 
6.3. Statistical methods  .............................................................................  36 
6.4. Ethics  ..................................................................................................  36 
7. RESULTS. IMPACT OF P4P  ...................................................................  37 
7.1. FDs and family nurses workload  ........................................................  37 
7.2. Childhood immunisation coverage  ....................................................  39 
6 
7.3. The impact of P4P on the number of specialist consultations and 
hospital bed days  ................................................................................  41 
7.4. Number of patients with chronic diseases  ..........................................  41 
7.5. Predictors of a good outcome in the P4P system  ...............................  42 
8. DISCUSSION. IMPACT OF P4P  .............................................................  45 
8.1. The workload  .....................................................................................  45 
8.2. Prevention  ..........................................................................................  45 
8.3. Number of specialist consultations and  hospital bed days in Estonia  46 
8.4. Chronic diseases  .................................................................................  47 
8.5. Preconditions for good outcome in P4P system  .................................  47 
8.6. Strengths and limitations of the study  ................................................  48 
9. CONCLUSIONS  .......................................................................................  49 
10. SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN  ..................................................................  50 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  ..........................................................................  55 
REFERENCES  ..............................................................................................  56 
PUBLICATIONS  ..........................................................................................  67 
CURRICULUM VITAE  ...............................................................................  105 
ELULOOKIRJELDUS  ..................................................................................  107 
 
  
7 
LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS 
1. Merilind E, Västra K, Salupere R, Kolde A, Kalda R. The impact of P4P 
on the workload of family practices in Estonia. Qual Prim Care. 2014; 
22(2):109–114. 
2. Merilind E, Salupere R, Västra K, Kalda R. The influence of per-
formance-based payment on childhood immunization coverage. Health 
Policy. 2015;119(6):770–777. 
3.  Merilind E, Salupere R, Västra K, Põldsam R, Kalda R. The impact of 
payment for performance on number of family doctors visits, specialist 
consultations and hospital bed occupancy. A longitudinal study. Qual 
Prim Care. 2016;24(1):23–28. 
4.  Merilind E, Salupere R, Västra K, Kalda R. Payment for performance of 
Estonian family doctors and impact of different practice and patient-
related characteristics on a good outcome: a quantitative assess-
ment. Medicina. 2016;52:192–198. 
 
Authors’ contributions: 
Eero Merilind (Study I, II, III, IV) has made substantial contributions to the 
conception, coordination and design of the study, also analysis and inter-
pretation of data. 
Rauno Salupere (Study I, II, III, IV) and Anastassia Kolde (Study I) per-
formed the statistical analysis. 
Katrin Västra (Study I, II, III, IV) and Reet Põldsam (Study III) have made 
substantial contributions to the acquisition of data. 
Ruth Kalda (Study I, II, III, IV) has been involved in drafting the manuscript 
and revising it critically. 
Papers are reproduced with the kind permission of the publishers: Radcliffe 
Publishing (Paper I), Elsevier (Paper II and IV) and Insight Medical Pub-
lishing (Paper III) 
 
The articles are reprinted with the permission of the copyright owners. 
 
  
8 
ABBREVIATIONS 
CHD  Coronary heart disease 
EHIF  Estonian Health Insurance Fund 
EHR   Electronic health records 
FD   Family doctor 
FFS   Fee-for-service 
GP   General practitioner 
ICD   International Classification of Diseases 
IOM   Institute of Medicine 
NHS   National Health Service (United Kingdom) 
PHC   Primary health care 
P4P  Payment for performance 
SCORE  Systematic Coronary Risk Evaluation 
QI   Quality indicator 
QOF  Quality and Outcomes Framework 
UK   United Kingdom 
 
  
9 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is overwhelming evidence, from many countries, that health care is often 
not delivered in accordance with scientifically set and commonly-agreed pro-
fessional standards. The result is that poor quality and unsafe care harms tens of 
thousands of people every year, and scarce health care resources are squan-
dered. [1] Many countries, which differ enormously in the way that their health 
systems are structured, are improving the quality of health care. Measuring 
quality is a first and essential step to reach that goal. [2] 
Quality of care is one the key dimensions of value. Engaging primary care 
practices in quality improvement activities is essential to achieving the triple 
aim of improving the health of the population, enhancing patient experiences 
and outcomes, and reducing the per capita cost of care, and to improving pro-
vider experience. [3] 
Central to quality improvement are processes for continuously monitoring 
and improving quality and systems of accountability. Components of clinical 
governance include evidence-based practice, clinical audit, risk management, 
mechanisms to monitor the outcomes of care, lifelong learning and systems for 
managing poor performance. [4] 
Different payment methods, capitation, salary, fee-for-service and mixed 
systems of payment have different effects on the behaviour of primary care phy-
sicians [5] and quality of care. [6] One possibility to encourage a better outcome 
is payment for performance (P4P). P4P financial incentive schemes reward 
doctors based on the quality and the outcomes of their treatment. [7] 
There have been discussions [8–11] about how to describe quality in health 
care [12], how to measure it, how to choose quality indicators, whether they 
should monitor process or health outcome targets, how to find suitable indi-
cators and how to combine it with financial incentives. Health care providers 
have questions about different quality dimensions in patients and professionals, 
increased or changed workload, lack of time for prevention and care of patients 
with chronic conditions, motivation triggers and of course the reliant payment. 
Policymakers and health care administrators want to know who should be re-
warded in P4P, how large the financial reward should be and whether this 
guarantees an improvement in health outcomes or healthcare system quality. 
In 2002 the US implemented P4P schemes and in 2004 the National Health 
Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom (UK) began a P4P initiative known as 
the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). [13] Several studies followed 
thereafter and described positive [14–17] or negative [18–19] effects of P4P in 
primary health care (PHC) and for the whole health care system. 
When Estonia started the P4P system to improve health care quality in 2006, 
the aim was to promote the quality of family health care services, stimulate 
family doctors (FD) to provide more and a wider range of services and reduce 
the burden on specialised medical care. It is now almost 10 years since this 
10 
system has existed and some results should be noticeable. Our recent studies 
will give more knowledge about this topic. 
This dissertation describes three aspects of payment for performance: effects 
on family doctors workload, differences in childhood immunisation coverage 
and impact on specialist consultations and number of hospital bed days, and 
discusses different practice and patient-related characteristics to find out pre-
dictors for a good outcome. 
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2. ESTONIAN CONTEXT 
2.1. Primary healthcare system 
The health care system in Estonia has seen profound reform since the early 
1990s. Among the main objectives of the health care reform were reorganising 
the public funding system and the overextended hospital system, improving the 
quality and accessibility of general medical care service, and a more efficient 
use of resources, including reform of primary care, which began in 1991 and 
was successfully completed by 2003. The training and introduction of FDs was 
central to this reform. In 2015, there were 806 working FDs in Estonia (52 FDs 
per 100 000 inhabitants). In Europe several countries have general practitioners 
(GP) in the primary healthcare system, which are called FDs in Estonia. 
In Estonia, the FD works together with the family nurse and is an indepen-
dent contractor with the Estonian Health Insurance Fund (EHIF). The FD’s 
contract contains different parts: payment per capita (five age groups), basic 
allowance for equipment and rooms, a fund for medical examinations and tests, 
a separate “therapeutic” fund, fee for distance from the nearest hospital and pay-
ment for second nurse and payment for the quality, etc. FDs in Estonia work as 
gatekeepers to diminish visits to secondary care. Every FD is responsible for the 
patients on their list, which could be from 1 200 up to 2 400 patients. If the 
FD’s list has more than 2 000 patients on the list, the employment of another 
doctor as an assistant doctor is needed. In 2015, 44.1 per cent worked as a 
single FD (one doctor practice) and 55.9 per cent worked as a group practice 
(more than one FD together). 
In 2006 Estonia started P4P for FDs. [20] The P4P is aimed at forcing FDs 
to pay more attention to prevention and monitoring chronic diseases. [21] FDs 
achieving a good outcome will receive an extra 5 per cent for the investigations 
(up to 37 per cent of the per capita payment). In 2014, 96.7 per cent of FDs 
were joined to P4P. 
The Estonian P4P for FDs includes clinical quality indicators for children 
(0–7 years old) as follow-up and immunisation indicators, screening of cardio-
vascular disease risk factors (40–60 years old), monitoring of patients with type 
2 diabetes and hypertension according to Estonian guidelines, follow-up of 
patients with hypothyreosis and post-myocardial infarction patients, providing 
minor surgery procedures and PAP smears, observation of pregnancy and parti-
cipation in CME courses for at least 60 hours per year. All 40–60 year old 
patients from FDs’ lists involved in the cardiovascular disease prevention pro-
gram (CDVP) were entitled to calculate their cardiovascular risk according to 
SCORE (Systematic Coronary Risk Evaluation) tables (from 2009) and Body 
Mass Index, to measure blood pressure, glucose level and cholesterol with 
fractions. Patients with a risk SCORE of more than 5 per cent were considered 
high cardiovascular risk patients and could be counselled by a nurse. Since 
2014 generic prescription angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitors (ACE in-
hibitors) for hypertensive patients is also involved in the P4P system. 
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2.2. Payment schemes in primary health care 
The components of the payment system for FDs in Estonia are presented below 
(Figure 1). 
1.  Capitation payments. These depend on the number of patients in the FDs’ 
practice list and are aimed at covering main services and expenditures with 
furnishing, practice pay funds and daily supplies. Since 2012 capitation 
payment is split into five groups (<3, 3–7, 7–50, 50–70 and ≥70 years). FDs 
with less than the minimum of 1 200 patients receive capitation for 1 200 
people in order to cover their fixed costs. Initially (starting from 1998), the 
capitation rates were equal for all age groups, but in 1999 adjustments for 
age were introduced, while in 2003 the difference in capitation across age 
groups was further expanded by raising the rate for children under two years 
of age by more than 50 per cent. [22–23] 
2. Basic allowance monthly payment 986.23 euros (data from 01.01.2016) 
aimed at covering the fixed operating cost of the practice: computers, pro-
grams, rent of the premises and other payments, vehicle payments or trans-
portation. 
3.  Fund for medical examinations and tests is seen as an incentive to provide 
services not covered by the capitation fee and it is disbursed after the pro-
vision of services based on invoices. This is in fact a fee-for-service payment 
adding up to 29 per cent of the total capitated amount and 34 per cent for 
FDs taking part in the quality bonus system. FDs achieving a good outcome 
in P4P will receive an extra 5 per cent for the investigations (up to 39 per 
cent of the per capita payment). 
4.  A separate “therapeutic fund” up to 3 per cent of capitation (cover servi-
ces provided by psychologists and speech therapists) and activity fund with 
no cap including minor surgery and gynaecological procedures that an FD 
can do by themself. 
5.  Distance allowance provides additional income depending on the distance 
to the nearest hospital. It is paid to FDs working more than 20 km from the 
nearest hospital. Two categories are distinguished: 20–40 km (monthly addi-
tional payment 133.65 euros) and more than 40 km from the nearest hospital 
(monthly additional payment 382.94 euros). 
6.  Pay-for-performance. Annually negotiated, it is paid once a year and 
depends on the level of provision of certain services. In January 2006 a 
performance-based payment system for FDs was launched to increase the 
quality and effectiveness of preventive care and improve the monitoring of 
chronic illnesses. 
7.  Payment for second nurse. Since 2013 FDs have the possibility to employ 
a second nurse, which is covered by the EHIF (monthly additional payment 
1 377.95 euros). 
8.  Payment for late opening times. Primary health care centres have the 
possibility to widen their opening times and earn additional income (hourly 
additional payment 25.04 euros for FDs and 15.85 euros for nurses). 
13
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9. Other additional payments. This includes payment for additional compe-
tence (annual payment 1 377.95 euros), excellent outcome of the primary 
health care centre (annual payment 159.78 euros) and for a good outcome in 
the cancer screening programme (not included into P4P) (annual payment 
958.68 euros). 
 
 
2.3. Payment for performance 
The Estonian P4P for FDs contains three major parts: prevention, monitoring of 
patients with chronic diseases according to national guidelines and professional 
competency (Table 1). 
FDs fulfilling all these criteria are entitled to extra payment. Payment-for-
performance is a reward for a good outcome, but its influence on the general 
budget is relatively small in different countries and in Estonia (2–4 per cent of 
the total budget of the FDs). 
Joining the P4P is a voluntary process for all FDs, is a part of the FDs 
contract and there are no sanctions if a doctor does not participate in the P4P. 
FDs participating in the P4P receive some increase of funds for investigations 
as a bonus. From this fund (which constitutes 27–32 per cent of the per capita 
payment) all investigations (X-rays, ultrasounds, blood tests, urine tests, ECGs, 
etc.) should be performed. 
Coverage targets in P4P are universal to all FDs and are increasing stepwise 
every year. FDs who achieved these targets earn points. The maximum number 
of points FDs can achieve in the P4P is 640, if the FD has collected more than 
75 per cent of the points (480 points), this is considered a good outcome. If FDs 
collect less than 75 per cent of the points this is considered a poor outcome. In a 
good outcome two different payments are foreseen – FDs who achieved 480–
539 points (75–84.4 per cent of the maximum) will earn 4 332.83 euros as 
annual payment and FDs with 540–640 points (84.5–100 per cent of the maxi-
mum) will earn 5 483.24 euros. FDs who achieved less than 479 points (less 
than 74.9 per cent of the maximum) have no extra payment. 
Since 2012, 96.6 per cent of FDs are joined to P4P and are motivated to 
achieve a good outcome. Every year the number of FDs with a good outcome 
has increased, but only half of FDs achieved a good outcome (in 2012). 
Since 2013 P4P is a part of FDs’ contract (with the EHIF) and all FDs are 
involved in P4P. 
In addition, some new indicators (type of prescribed medications to treat 
hypertension and percentage of generic prescriptions) are implemented. 
Since 2015 P4P is mandatory for all FDs. 
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Table 1. P4P components in Estonian family practice quality payment scheme 
Indicator Description 
Part 1 (Prevention) 
Immunisations Pertussis, Diphtheria, Tetanus, Poliomyelitis, Measles, Mumps, 
Rubella, Hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenza type b according 
to immunisation plan 
Children health 
controls 
in 1, 3, 6, and 12 months old, 2 years old, preschool health 
control 
Cardiovascular 
disease prevention 
programme 
40–60 years old, blood pressure, glucose, cholesterol with 
fractions. 
SCORE calculation – High and low cardiovascular risk charts 
based on gender, age, total cholesterol, systolic blood pressure 
and smoking status, with relative risk chart, qualifiers and 
instructions 
Part 2 (Chronic diseases) 
Diabetes mellitus 
type 2 
Register of patients with type 2 diabetes, measuring glucose 
and HbA1c, cholesterol with fractions, serum creatinine testing, 
urine tests to detect microalbuminuria, blood pressure measure-
ment, nurse counselling 
Hypertension Register of patients with hypertension (divided into three 
stages), glucose, cholesterol with fractions, serum creatinine 
testing, urine tests to detect microalbuminuria, blood pressure 
measurement, ECG, nurse counselling, treatment with ACE 
inhibitors 
Myocardial 
infarction 
Register of patients with myocardial infarction, cholesterol with 
fractions, ECG, blood pressure measurement, nurse counselling 
Hypothyroidism Register of patients with hypothyreosis, TSH testing 
Part 3 (Enhanced services) 
 
Observation of pregnancy, PAP smear tests, minor surgery pro-
cedures 
 Participation in CME courses (at least 60 hours per year) 
Maximum number of points 640 
Good outcome more than 480 points (≥75%) 
Poor outcome less than 479 points (<74.9%) 
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3. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
3.1. Primary health care 
Primary health care can be characterised as the first level of access to care and 
is provided near patients’ homes. [24–26] Primary health care includes curative 
and rehabilitative care, preventive care and health education. [27] A major 
challenge in health services research is to show what configurations of PHC are 
associated with better outcomes, in terms of quality, equity and costs. [28] 
A major step in the global attention for primary care has been the WHO 
Declaration of Alma-Ata from 1978. [29] The Declaration stressed the impor-
tance of creating and sustaining a strong primary (health) care system, not just 
as a part of the health care system, but in particular linked to other sectors as 
well. [30] Alma-Ata has inspired countries in Europe to develop their own 
structure of the ‘first line’ health care services. After the collapse of the Com-
munist regimes in 1991, countries in Central and Eastern Europe were forced to 
fundamentally restructure their health care systems, including primary care. 
[31–32] Today, the strengthening of primary care worldwide is probably higher 
on the agenda than ever. [33] 
 
 
3.2. Different payment models of primary care 
The traditional classification of PHC includes three main systems of payment, 
i.e. salary, capitation and fee-for-service (FFS). However, in practice, varieties 
of them exist, such as integrated capitation and mixed payment systems [6] 
(Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. A description of payment terms according to Appleby et al. [34] 
Payment 
term/system  Description  
Capitation 
Lump sum payment per patient/member of population served by a 
provider for comprehensive services or particular categories of 
service regardless of treatment. 
Is the majority of FDs’ income and payment is related to the number 
of patients on their list weighted by their age. 
Fee-for-service 
Activity-based (prospectively set) unit payment for a defined inter-
vention regardless of patient characteristics. Is part of FDs’ contract 
for providing specified services and investigations. 
Pay-for-
performance 
Payment linked to achievement of specific performance targets. FDs 
earn extra payments if they provide specified levels of service.  
Mixed systems A combination of different payment methods. Is usually used in FDs contracts. 
17 
For FDs’ services the mixed systems of payments for infrastructure plus 
weighted capitation and pay-for-performance are widely used. [35] 
In an environment where FDs are of differing quality and heterogeneous 
patients have different preferences for quality, it is shown that FFS coupled 
with balance billing is a superior payment scheme to just FFS or capitation pay-
ments, as it generates an efficient allocation of FDs between high and low qua-
lity and an efficient allocation of patients between FDs. Where patients have 
more than one condition it is shown that FFS allows patients to seek treatment 
from FDs of differing quality conditional on the medical condition they have. 
[36] 
 
3.3. Definitions of quality 
There are many definitions of quality used both in relation to health care and 
health systems. 
Avedis Donabedian defines quality: “Quality of care is the kind of care 
which is expected to maximise an inclusive measure of patient welfare, after 
one has taken account of the balance of expected gains and losses that attend the 
process of care in all its parts.” [37] 
The Institute of Medicine describes healthcare quality as the extent to which 
health services provided to individuals and patient populations improve desired 
health outcomes. The care should be based on the strongest clinical evidence 
and provided in a technically and culturally competent manner with good com-
munication and shared decision-making. [38] 
The World Health Organization says quality of care is the level of attainment 
of health systems’ intrinsic goals for health improvement and responsiveness to 
legitimate expectations of the population. [39] 
In 1994, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on the Future of Pri-
mary Care defined primary care as “the provision of integrated, accessible 
health care services by clinicians who are accountable for addressing a large 
majority of personal health care needs, developing a sustained partnership with 
patients, and practising in the context of family and the community.” [40] 
Safran et al. [41] developed the Primary Care Assessment Survey (PCAS), a 
patient-completed questionnaire that operationalises formal definitions of pri-
mary care. The PCAS measures seven domains of care through 11 summary 
scales: accessibility (organisational, financial), continuity (longitudinal, visit-
based), comprehensiveness (contextual knowledge of patient, preventive coun-
selling), integration, clinical interaction (clinician-patient communication, 
thoroughness of physical examinations), interpersonal treatment, and trust. 
Scientific research, both international comparisons and within the United 
States, has shown that well developed PHC systems have better coordination 
and continuity of care and better opportunities to control costs. [42–45] Re-
search from the USA has shown that availability of FDs and first contact care 
are associated with reduced unnecessary care (avoidable hospitalisation) and 
increased accessibility. [46–48] Avoidable hospital admissions can be used as 
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an indicator of health care performance. The availability of FDs and insurance 
coverage for PHC are related to lower rates of avoidable hospitalisations. [49] 
A negative effect is that patient satisfaction seems to be lower in health care 
systems with regulated access to specialist services by gate keeping. [50–51] 
Health policies aimed at strengthening primary care are associated with 
better levels of health. [52] Strong primary care is associated with better health 
outcomes such as lower rates of all-cause, heart disease, and cancer mortalities. 
[53] 
In Europe there were contrasts between regions within Europe and FDs 
within countries showed large differences in their service profiles. The inter-
national differences were related to characteristics of the health care systems, 
such as the FDs’ employment status, gate keeping role and mode of remune-
ration. [54–56] 
 
3.4. Quality indicators (QI) 
Quality indicators are specific and measurable elements of practice that can be 
used to assess the quality of care. [57] “They are usually derived from retro-
spective reviews of medical records or routine information sources. The good 
QI should define care that is attributable and within the control of the person 
who is delivering the care. QI are different from guidelines and from standards. 
It is important to recognise that QI are indicators, rather than definitive judge-
ments about quality.” [58] 
Different studies have investigated how to choose different QI to achieve 
better outcomes, how financial incentives in P4P programmes have improved 
the quality of care and what the consequences are. [59–60] Jones et al. [60] 
showed that the selection of QI is important and poor indicator selection may 
result in unintended consequences. 
There is wide variation in the number of indicators included in P4P schemes. 
[61] For example, in the UK there are currently 134, the Queensland Practice 
Incentives Program pilot in Australia had 7, Medicare Australia’s Practice 
Incentives Program has 13, Tuscany’s Performance Evaluation System has 50 
measures consisting of more than 130 indicators, and Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services/Premier (CMS-Premier) pilot also had several QIs. [62–65] 
The decision on how many indicators to include is a delicate balancing act. On 
the one hand, there is the desire to cover all issues to guard against selective 
focus through the implication that activities not measured are unimportant. On 
the other hand, as the number of indicators grows, so do the resources of time 
and health information technology required to collect and analyse the data. 
Through the use of a structured expert review process, the OECD Health 
Care Quality Indicators project has identified rates of avoidable admissions for 
long-term conditions and internationally comparable indicators of the quality of 
primary care. Some other important Health Care Quality Indicators are: asthma, 
diabetes, congestive heart failure hospital admission rates, rate of childhood 
vaccination for pertussis, measles and rate of influenza vaccination for elderly 
19 
people. Further indicators on the quality and safety of prescribing in primary 
care are under development. [66] 
 
 
3.5. QI – process or health outcome targets? 
There is the question of whether to set process or health outcome targets. The 
ultimate goal of P4P schemes is to improve the health through improvements in 
quality, equity, and efficiency of care of populations served. [67–68] However, 
outcome targets are problematic in several respects. First, except for in the case 
of mortality and morbidity caused by medical errors, desired health outcomes 
frequently do not take place in the short-term period over which measurement is 
taking place. Second, for those that can be measured in the short term (reduc-
tions in blood pressure, HbA1c level, cholesterol), information asymmetry 
issues arise between the physician who provides guidance on appropriate di-
sease management and the patient who may, or may not, follow that prescribed 
course of care. [69–70] 
On the question of whether P4P measures do actually cause improvement in 
health, the literature is fairly lean. In one interrupted time series study of the im-
pact of the UK’s QOF (Quality and Outcomes Framework), Serumaga et al. 
[71] found that after controlling for secular trends, the QOF had no discernible 
impact on cumulative incidence of stroke, myocardial infarction, renal failure, 
heart failure, or all-cause mortality. They do note, however, that the quality of 
care pre-QOF implementation was already quite high, a fact noted by other re-
searchers as well. [72] 
Crosson et al. [73] compared care processes and intermediate outcomes of 
US and UK practices on P4P measures of randomly selected patients with 
diabetes or coronary artery disease prior to pay-for-performance initiatives, and 
found gaps in chronic illness care quality across both samples. 
Different European countries like Denmark, England, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, with the addition of Australia and Canada have diffe-
rent financial incentives for better management of chronic diseases. [74–75] As 
health systems differ widely, each country must find their own solution. [76] 
 
 
3.6. QI and financial incentives  
for improving the quality 
Measurable international indicators to monitor the quality of primary care are 
used in more than 30 European countries. [77] Available data for 10 countries 
primary care QI are used and combined with financial incentives. In eight 
countries QI can influence the finances/salary of family physicians with a bonus 
of 1–25 per cent of their total income. The influence of incentives was weak in 
Spain and in Italy [78] (Table 3). 
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Table 3. European countries with primary care Quality Indicators (QI) related to pay-
ment 
Year of 
intro-
duction 
Number of QI Main fields of QI QI related increase 
of income (in %) 
(approximately) 
2004 134 Clinical services, organisational, 
patient’s experience, additional 
services 
25 
2006 66 Indicators for FDs, nurses, odonto-
logy, paediatrics, social workers 
1–2 
2006 40 Access to care, cardiovascular risk, 
diabetes, maternity services, 
paediatric care 
10 
2006 60 P4P: prevention, chronic disease 
management, comprehensive care 
  2–4 [79]  
2009 15 (adult), 
6 (paediatric) 
Prevention, screening activity, 
hypertension, lipids, coronary heart 
disease, diabetes, referrals 
5 
2010 21 Prevention, chronic disease manage-
ment (e.g. diabetes, hypertension), 
ambulance visits 
5 
2010 1 Diabetes (different in 20 regions) < 1 
2010 17–20 Diabetes, COPD 7 (local experiment) 
2011 22 Bonus payment: population care 
coverage, prevention, hospitali-
sation, chronic diseases 
9 
2011 20 Prevention, COPD, asthma 10 
 
 
Over the past two decades funders and policymakers worldwide have experi-
mented with initiatives to change physicians’ behaviour and improve the quality 
and efficiency of medical care. [80] The NHS in the UK, Medicare in the 
United States and many private insurers have adopted P4P schemes as a key 
strategy. The schemes are based on a basic tenet of economics and psychology: 
that people respond to rewards. [81] 
Scott et al. [19] state that use of financial incentives to reward FDs for im-
proving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing. However, there is 
insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to 
improve the quality of PHC. 
Patients, professionals, managers, funders and policymakers alike are inte-
rested in increasing the performance of health services, but are also worried 
about the costs. One way of aligning performance with costs is to work with 
appropriate financial and non-financial incentives. The underlying goal of 
incentives is therefore not simply rewarding good performance or punishing bad 
performance. The goal of using incentives is to support the change in the status 
quo by stimulating both immediate and long-term improvements in perfo-
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rmance through reinforcing positive performance by creating alignment 
between expectations and rewards (financial/non-financial) and removing finan-
cial barriers that perversely effect desired performance. [82] 
 
 
3.7. Different types of incentive models  
for funders of health services 
1.  Bonuses – Increased allocation based on the achievement of performance 
measures. 
2.  Enhanced payment/bonus – The purpose is to address the ‘costs of comp-
liance’ health service providers are required to make in order to meet the 
performance expectations. The amount will depend on the benefits/savings 
the targeted organisation can derive from the improvement. 
3.  Link funding increase to performance – Similar to the bonus model, part 
of the allocation is based on performance. Unlike bonuses, it is not in the 
form of additional money but puts (part of) potential rate increases at risk 
based on performance. 
4.  Savings from efficiency – Health service providers are allowed to keep the 
surplus or parts of it. 
5.  Gain sharing – Share savings between funder and health service provider 
where savings for the funder are anticipated from performance improvement. 
6.  Grants – To promote and share best practices. This provides an incentive to 
develop new and innovative ways to improve performance by recognising 
and rewarding excellent practices of the health service provider. 
7.  Performance fund – Health service providers are eligible (non-competitive) 
for financial support to build capacity or developing and implementing 
performance improvement activities. 
8.  Pay for activities – Pay health service providers separately for services that 
improve performance. 
9.  Public disclosure and/or recognition – Disclosure of information to the 
public on the improvement of health service providers’ performance. Re-
cognition would be one step further where the best performance is ‘high-
lighted’. 
 
 
3.8. P4P in different countries 
P4P payment schemes have been introduced in many countries over the last 10 
years. [83] We choose some of them for description. These policies base a part 
of each doctor’s income on indicators designed to measure individual perfor-
mance. [64] Many countries are using or also considering financial incentive 
schemes. [84–86] 
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3.8.1. Australia 
Australia focused on increasing immunisation rates in children with the General 
Practice Immunization Incentive Scheme, launched in 1997. [87] In addition, in 
1998 Medicare Australia began making bonus payments to GP practices that 
met, or were working towards meeting, accreditation standards under the Prac-
tice Incentives Program (PIP-1). More recently, in 2006, the Veteran’s Affairs 
Department of the Commonwealth began a P4P scheme that pays hospitals that 
serve veterans for meeting surgical outcomes, patient safety and satisfaction, 
and chronic disease management targets. [64] Finally, Medicare Australia 
began piloting a new version of the Practice Incentives Program (PIP-2) system 
in 2007 aimed at GP practices. The PIP-2 currently comprises 13 incentives in-
cluding quality prescribing, diabetes, cervical screening, asthma, indigenous 
health, e-Health, after hours care, teaching, rural loading, aged care access, and 
a final incentive aimed at ensuring access to surgical, anaesthetic, and obstetric 
services in rural regions. [63] 
 
 
3.8.2. Canada 
Ontario’s health care system was the first in Canada to integrate P4P goals into 
physician compensation and has done so only since 2004 to 2005 when it gave 
FDs the option of switching from the traditional FFS contract to either a 
blended capitation contract called the “Family Health Network” or an enhanced 
FFS contract called the “Family Health Group”; by 2006, the number of FDs 
enrolled in these models together exceeded the traditional FFS contract. [88–89] 
Both of the new contracts incorporate P4P incentives aimed at targets in the 
following areas: access/after-hour care, chronic disease management, smoking 
cessation, preventive care, group management and leadership, and serious 
mental illness. [61] 
 
 
3.8.3. Italy 
GP payment systems are three-tiered, with the first tier a fixed component based 
on the adjusted risk of the GP’s patient list, the second tier is a variable com-
ponent based on “other” services provided (minor surgery, prevention activities, 
post-surgery follow-up), and the final “additional” component is effectively a 
reward for cost containment and is assessed on the basis of the costs of labs, 
pharmaceuticals, and services prescribed. [90–91] 
 
 
3.8.4. Spain 
Spain decentralised its national health care system in 2000. While primary care 
providers are paid across most of the country via retrospective payment 
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systems, the Catalonia region in the 1990s began developing contracts with 
primary care providers that include adjusted capitation budgets and variable 
components based on quality-based performance indicators in the areas of 
quality of care, coordination, and efficiency. [92–93] These variable compo-
nents currently make up 15 of the payments made to primary care providers for 
the region and are linked to health promotion and prevention activities. 
 
 
3.8.5. United Kingdom 
In the UK, the NHS began a major pay-for-performance initiative in 2004, 
known as the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). Aimed at FDs, the 
QOF was launched with the goal of reducing variations in the quality of care in 
the UK. Altogether, 138 indicators covered clinical care for 10 chronic diseases, 
practice organisation, patient experience, and an “other” category covers speci-
fic priorities in a given year. [94] 
The initial QOF consisted of 146 indicators, including several measures of 
patient satisfaction which, due to high levels of satisfaction across the board and 
the cost involved with data collection, were replaced with one measure of 
patient experience (patient consultation length) in 2006. [27] 
After the first year of the programme, FDs met 96.7 per cent of the clinical 
targets and received payment increase in the annual income of individual 
physicians, which was 22 per cent more than the NHS had budgeted. [14] 
 
 
3.8.6. United States 
The United States has a multipayer system with the majority of the payers being 
private, for-profit insurance companies, although the federal government via 
Medicaid, Medicare, and the Veteran’s Administration is the largest single 
payer. [95] With per capita health care costs that are the highest in the world, 
and health outcomes that do not rise to that level of spending, individual payers 
and the federal government started piloting P4P programmes in 2002 in reaction 
to the Institute of Medicine’s Crossing the Quality Chasm call to action. [96] In 
their 2004 systematic review, Rosenthal et al. [97] identified 37 P4P initiatives 
implemented by 31 for-profit plans in the United States, covering a patient 
population of 20 million. The largest P4P pilot initiative in the United States 
was CMS-Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID), a 
partnership between the Centres for Medicare & Medicaid Services and Premier 
Healthcare Informatics, which launched in 2003. [65] 
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3.9. Effects of P4P 
P4P is intended to bring the best scientific evidence to primary care practice. 
[98] Several reviews of the impact of P4P in primary care suggest that the 
programmes generally have had limited positive impacts [12,14,17,99–100] and 
various countries are looking at whether a similar initiative could be used in 
their primary care systems. [101–103] Positive effects of financial incentives 
[17] include cost savings to the Medicaid programme from shorter nursing 
home stays [104], small improvements in cervical cancer screening and im-
proved immunisation rates. [105] As positive effects of P4P, Lai [106] showed 
that when physicians participated in the P4P programme, this increased the 
likelihood that patients would receive guideline-recommended tests or exami-
nations. Gillam and Siriwardena [107] described modest cost-effective reduc-
tions in mortality and hospital admissions in some domains. 
However, several studies found either no effect [108] or negative effects, 
such as reduced access to health care for the most severely ill patients [109], 
they also noted a tendency towards improvements in documentation of care 
rather than a change in the actual quality of care. [110] 
The introduction of P4P schemes seemed to accelerate in programme named 
activities, but quality quickly reached a plateau. Incentives had little apparent 
impact on non-incentivised activities in the short term, but seem to have had 
some detrimental effects in the longer term, possibly because of practices 
focusing on patients for whom rewards applied. [111] 
High scores on the QOF might have partly resulted from “gaming”. Some 
practices seemed to have achieved high scores by excluding large numbers of 
patients, although it was unclear whether these exclusions were for sound 
clinical reasons or in order to maximise income. [112] One study from Chen et 
al. [113] confirmed that older patients and patients with more comorbidities or 
more severe conditions are prone to be excluded from P4P programmes. 
Evidence on the effect of P4P on quality is limited. P4P schemes can have 
an effect on the behaviour of physicians and can lead to better clinical mana-
gement of disease, but there is cause for concern about the impact on the quality 
of care. [114] 
The main idea of P4P is that there are associations between the size of finan-
cial payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain. 
Fleetcroft et al. [115] measured health gain as expected lives saved in one year 
and in quality adjusted life years. They found evidence for lives saved or quality 
adjusted life years gained for 28 indicators accounting for 41 of the total 
incentive payments. No associations were found between the size of financial 
payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain at the 
performance threshold for maximum payment measured in lives saved or 
quality adjusted life years. 
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3.9.1. Family doctors workload 
Already several years since the UK started the pay-for-performance program-
mes in family practices, [14] different countries are thinking about the value for 
money [116] and assessed the workload before and after the introduction of the 
pay-for-performance contracts. 
The findings from previous studies suggest that general practices responded 
to the 2004 GP contract in the UK by increasing the numbers of FDs, nursing 
staff and administrative staff. Implementing the new contract required attention 
to clinical and information systems needed to comply with new performance 
criteria. It is therefore unsurprising that practices increased the numbers of their 
administrative staff. The relative increase in nursing staff was higher than that 
for FDs. While there was no change in the average hours per week devoted to 
patient care by either nursing staff or FDs, the number of visits to nursing staff 
increased while the number of visits to FDs declined. [117] 
This suggests that, as with the 1990 GP contract [118], the extra clinical 
workload placed on general practices by the 2004 contract has been absorbed 
more by nursing staff than by doctors. Charles-Jones et al. [119] also showed 
that the difficulty of FDs’ work may have increased as routine care is delegated 
to nursing staff, leaving FDs to manage the more complex patient problems. In 
contrast to doctors, nursing staff reported an increase in both visit rates and the 
complexity of those visits. This is understandable, as nursing staff assumed 
greater responsibility for patient management. 
Overall, the findings suggest that expanding nursing staff roles may be an 
effective strategy for increasing the quality of primary care. Systematic reviews 
of previous research suggest that primary care nursing staff can deliver as high-
quality care as FDs in the areas of preventive health care, routine follow-up of 
patients with long-term conditions and first- contact care for people with minor 
illness. [120–121] 
Most UK GPs reported that the new contract had increased their income (88 
per cent), but decreased their professional autonomy (71 per cent) and increased 
their administrative (94 per cent) and clinical (86 per cent) workloads. [122] 
 
 
3.9.2. Specialist consultations and hospitalisations 
Iezzi et al. [123] showed that financial payment might help improve the quality 
of care and reduce hospitalisations. In another study, the implementation of P4P 
reduced the rate of specialist consultations and hospitalisations. [124] Recent 
studies showed that P4P reduced the likelihood of diabetes-related hospitali-
sations for diabetic patients. [125–126] A P4P scheme can significantly increase 
the receipt of quality care and decrease hospitalisation rates among patients 
with diabetes. [127–128] Harrison et al. [129] described that the introduction of 
a major national P4P scheme for primary care in England was associated with a 
decrease in emergency admissions for incentivised conditions compared with 
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conditions that were not incentivised. Patients enrolled in the P4P programme 
underwent significantly more diabetes-specific examinations and tests after 
enrolment; the differences between the intervention and comparison groups 
declined gradually over time but remained significant. Patients in the inter-
vention groups had a significantly higher number of diabetes-related physician 
visits in only the first year after enrolment and had fewer diabetes-related 
hospitalisations in the follow-up period. [130] For coronary heart disease, the 
lack of an association between quality scores and admission rates suggests that 
improving the quality of primary care may not reduce demands on the hospital 
sector. [131] 
Edwards et al. [132] investigated the number of visits to generalists and 
specialists. The proportion of visits to generalists increased from 88.4 per cent 
in 1997 to 92.4 per cent in 2010. The proportion of specialist decreased from 
30.6 per cent in 1997 to 9.8 per cent in 2010 (p < 0.01). 
Specialists like to take care of older patients (mean age 61 years) and 
dedicate most of their visits to chronic disease management (51.0 per cent), 
while generalists will see younger patients (mean age 55.4 years) and most 
commonly for new problems (40.5 per cent). Quality of care for cardiovascular 
disease was better in visits to cardiologists than in visits to generalists, but was 
similar or better in visits to generalists compared to visits to other medical 
specialists. 
 
3.9.3. Prevention 
P4P includes several activities for prevention (smoking cessation counselling, 
diabetes testing, cancer screens, immunisations, etc.). 
Coleman [133] mentioned that financial incentives undoubtedly influence 
FDs’ activities, but delivery of health promotion counselling may not always 
have the effects intended. There is strong, observational evidence that targets 
and incentives intended to increase smoking cessation counselling by FDs have 
merely increased their propensity to record this activity in patients’ medical 
records. Greene [134] investigated P4P in Australia and found there was a 
short-term increase in diabetes testing and cervical cancer screens after 
programme implementation. The increase, however, was for all FDs. Neither 
signing onto the programme nor claiming incentive payments was associated 
with increased diabetes testing or cervical cancer screening. FDs reported that 
the incentive did not influence their behaviour, largely due to the modest 
payment and the complexity of tracking patients and claiming payment. 
In 2005 physician groups in California participating in a pay-for-perfor-
mance programme showed across the board improvement on cervical cancer 
screening, diabetes screening and childhood immunisations, according to the 
Integrated Healthcare Association. Participating physician groups provided 
about 60 000 more cervical cancer screenings and 12 000 more diabetes 
screenings in 2005 than in 2004. Among health maintenance organisation 
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members, childhood immunisations were up about 30 000, the Integrated 
Healthcare Association said. [16] 
Tara et al. [135] found no significant step change in the screening rate for 
any of the three cancers the year after incentives were introduced. Colon cancer 
screening was increasing at a rate of 3.0 per cent per year before the incentives 
were introduced and 4.7 per year after. The cervical and breast cancer screening 
rates did not change significantly from year to year before or after the incentives 
were introduced. Between 2006–2007 and 2009–2010, US$28.3 million, 
US$31.3 million and US$50.0 million were spent on financial incentives for 
cervical, breast, and colorectal cancer screening, respectively (Ontario, Canada). 
In conclusion, Tara wrote that P4P was associated with little or no improvement 
in screening rates despite substantial expenditure. 
Immunisation plays a big part in FDs’ work and immunisation coverage rate 
is an important public health goal. Chien et al. [136] showed the impact of P4P 
programmes aimed at rewarding up-to-date immunisation delivery to 2-year-
olds according to the recommended series (New York; USA). The Hudson 
Health Plan introduced a US$200 bonus payment for each fully immunised 2-
year-old and provided administrative supports for identifying children who may 
need immunisations. Immunisation rates within the Hudson Health Plan in-
creased significantly among other health plans. 
 In the UK (QOF) influenza immunisation is a part of P4P [137] (for patients 
with coronary heart disease (CHD), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
diabetes, and stroke) and it showed increases in the proportion of immunised 
CHD patients, as negative consequences and increased exceptions rates and led 
to “gaming”. [138] After this clinical quality indicator was withdrawn from a 
national incentive scheme, influenza immunisation became less statistically 
significant. [139] 
 
 
3.9.4. Management of chronic diseases 
It was found that payment methods have important implications for the nature 
and quality of services provided to chronically ill patients. 
Pay-for-performance programmes are often aimed at improving the manage-
ment of chronic diseases. Pape et al. [140] focused on targets for intermediate 
outcomes in patients with cardiovascular disease and diabetes and found that 
P4P led to significantly higher target achievements (hypertension, CHD, 
diabetes, stroke), but one reason for achieving a good outcome was higher rates 
of exception reporting in patients with all conditions except for stroke. 
Exception reporting allows practitioners to exclude patients from target 
calculations if certain criteria are met. There were no statistically significant 
improvements in mean blood pressure, cholesterol or HbA1c levels. 
Kirschner et al. [141] showed that after one year, a significant improvement 
was shown for the process indicators for all chronic conditions (diabetes, 
COPD, asthma, cardiovascular risk management) ranging from +7.9 improve-
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ment for cardiovascular risk management to +11.5 for asthma. Five outcome 
indicators significantly improved as well as patients’ experiences with GP’s 
functioning and organisation of care. No significant improvements were seen 
for influenza vaccination rate and the cervical cancer screening uptake. The 
clinical process and outcome indicators, as well as patient experience indicators 
were affected by baseline measures. Karunaratne et al. [142] investigated risk 
factors related to chronic kidney disease and management of hypertension in 
primary care and estimated the cost implications of the resulting changes in 
prescribing patterns of antihypertensive medication. As a result, the authors 
described that population blood pressure control has improved since the 
introduction of P4P renal indicators, and this improvement has been sustained. 
This was associated with a significant increase in the use of antihypertensive 
medication, resulting in increased prescription cost. Hjerpe et al. [143] showed 
that in Sweden, after the introduction of the new reimbursement system, 
registered codes for hypertension and cancer diseases in the Skaraborg primary 
care database increased for hypertension and cancer, probably partly due to an 
increased diagnosis coding. 
Cardiovascular disease (CVD) patients who were treated by physicians 
participating in P4P were more likely to receive quality care than patients who 
were not. Patients who received quality care were less likely to have new 
coronary events or be hospitalised, or have uncontrolled lipids than patients 
who did not. A P4P programme was associated with increased lipid monitoring 
and treatment. [144] Lee et al. [145] studied mean systolic and diastolic blood 
pressure and cholesterol levels and concluded that the implementation of P4P 
resulted in improvements in blood pressure control. 
The important role of management of chronic diseases falls on nurses. In 
countries where primary care is based largely on multi-professional teams of 
physicians, nurses and other health professionals and where patients are 
registered with a specific primary care facility, there has been a progressive 
increase in the role of nurses in managing many chronic diseases. [146] 
 
 
3.10. Who should be rewarded in P4P? 
An important point relevant to P4P rewards is who gets paid. The most common 
theme discussed in the literature is whether to pay individual providers versus 
making payments to the group practice, leaving the distribution of rewards up to 
group management. Paying individual providers can reduce coordination of care 
because providers want to get credit for gains made by patients; in addition, 
these rewards can fail to incentivise systems improvements (i.e. management, 
information tracking processes) that are best addressed by collective action. 
[61] On the contrary, paying the group can result in a subset of providers 
electing to “free-ride” off of others. In regions where single-handed practices 
prevail, this is not an issue; however, for hospitals and areas where large and/or 
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integrated provider groups predominate, a mix of individual and group rewards 
is likely optimal. [147] 
Notably, P4P rewards are generally paid to physicians or top management 
with no guidance as to how best to distribute the rewards, with the exception of 
the Catalonia region of Spain where the management by objective policy 
provides individual objectives for physicians, nurses and managers. [148] 
In the UK’s QOF, Campbell et al. [149] identified resentment among nurses 
who were providing valuable chronic disease management and other care to 
meet the QOF indicators but generally were not seeing the financial rewards. In 
the UK, the QOF rewards are paid to practices and management and often the 
physician(s) decides how to distribute it. 
The question arises as to how large the financial reward should be to 
motivate physicians, by their selection of profession, by financial reward versus 
the knowledge of knowing they are doing a good job. While not discussed in 
the literature, the answer to this question might be correlated to base level of 
pay, which varies significantly across countries. In addition, there is some 
concern that if the rewards are too large, negative incentives to game the system 
will become problems. One qualitative study that surveyed 643 health 
maintenance organisation managers (44 per cent response rate) found that a 
bonus amounting to 5 per cent of a physician’s salary is necessary to motivate 
action. [150] 
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4. STUDY RATIONALE 
Estonian research has long traditions to study PHC and health care quality 
[151–154] and in the scientific literature we can find a positive and negative 
description of the experience from different countries. 
The studies [19,100] in this field showed that P4P has an impact on out-
patient visits in primary and secondary care, as well as on hospitalisations and 
bed days of patients with two main chronic diseases (hypertension and type 2 
diabetes). [155–157] 
FDs who achieved a good outcome in P4P have better continuity of care for 
chronic diseases. This situation also reduced the number of specialist consul-
tations. FDs who achieved a good outcome in P4P had less chronic patients in 
their lists. The study suggested that it should be considered to provide extra 
incentives for these FDs who have more chronic patients in their lists. [124] 
We have chosen several indicators (workload, immunisation coverage rate, 
patient and practice-related characteristics on good outcome) that are available 
and describe the P4P most accurately. Workload had a previous correlation to 
P4P, while immunisation coverage is a generally accepted indicator for the 
assessment of prevention. Reduced number of hospitalisations can be used as an 
indicator of PHC performance. 
We chose those indicators because we had reliable data available and the 
information was well documented. We obtained information about all FDs and 
we could test some hypotheses from previous studies. 
As Estonia has had a P4P scheme already for 10 years, an evaluation of the 
effects of P4P on the FDs’ work and on the whole health care system can be 
made. 
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5. AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The aim of the study was to find out the impact of P4P on health care system as 
well as to discover what effects the patient and practice-related characteristics 
have on a good outcome in the P4P system. 
For this purpose the following specific aims were set: 
1. To investigate the impact of P4P on the workload of family practices, 
specialists and number of hospital days in Estonia 
2. To study the impact of P4P in prevention: differences in immunisation 
coverage rate between FDs participating in the P4P and those not partici-
pating 
3. To explain the preconditions of good outcome in a P4P system. 
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6. SUBJECTS AND METHODS 
6.1. Study design 
We conducted four different quantitative research studies to investigate the 
effects of P4P. The study design, samples, objectives, methods and observation 
periods are described below (Table 4). 
 
 
Table 4. Overview of conducted studies 
 
Studies Study 
design 
Study 
sample 
Objective Methods Observation 
period 
Study I Retro-
spective 
All FDs in 
Estonia 
(Figure 2) 
Workload
Workload was defined as: 
1) the total number of 
visits to the FDs and 
family nurses in Estonia, 
and 
2) the number of visits 
per one family doctor and 
one family nurse. 
2 groups:
FDs joined and 
FDs not joined 
in P4P  
2005–2011 
Study II Retro-
spective 
All FDs in 
Estonia 
(Figure 2) 
Immunisation coverage 
rate 
2 groups:
FDs joined and 
FDs not joined 
in P4P  
2006–2012 
Study III Longi-
tudinal 
Study sample
 
Number of FDs visits, 
specialist consultations 
and days in hospital  
FDs who had a 
good outcome 
in a P4P system 
and those who 
did not have in 
P4P 
2014 
(01.01.2014–
31.01.2014) 
Study IV Retro-
spective 
All FDs in 
Estonia 
500 (2006) – 
772 (2012) 
Different practice and 
patient-related 
characteristics 
FDs who had a 
good outcome 
in a P4P system 
and those who 
did not have in 
P4P  
2006–2012 
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Figure 2. Percentage of FDs joined to the P4P and not joined to the P4P in Estonia, 
2006–2012. 
 
 
6.2. Data sources 
The studies were conducted using the database from the Estonian Health Insu-
rance Fund, which consists of health-related data of 96 per cent of the Estonian 
population. The database does not cover the data of those 4 per cent of the 
population who have no medical insurance. The database was created on the 
basis of the health service invoices sent by family physicians to the EHIF for 
payment. These invoices list all services provided to the patients including all 
visits to FDs and family nurses, as well as the diagnoses of the patients ac-
cording to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). The data of 
service-providing family physicians are also included in the health service 
invoices. Data sources for all studies were health service invoices sent to the 
EHIF database (Table 5). 
To be able to assess FDs and nurses performance according to health service 
invoices, special new codes were entered on invoices, such as nurse visit, 
refusal of vaccinations, codes for small children check-ups, etc. Based on 
collected data we could evaluate the performance of every single FD and nurse. 
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Table 5. Data sources 
 
Studies Data 
Study I The total number of visits, number of primary visits (first visit during the 
episode of the illness during one calendar year), secondary visits (repeated 
visits which are needed during the episode of the certain illness during one 
calendar year), home visits and visits provided by the nurse were analysed  
Study II All immunisations have a separate code according to state health service 
price list and are marked on FDs’ invoices. Refusals or contraindications 
to immunisations are also coded and listed in the invoice. Every FD has 
their own list of patients and the target group for vaccinations is known 
for the period starting from 1 January and ending on 31 December. To 
achieve the maximum number of quality points the vaccination target 
group should be vaccinated according to coverage targets of 90 per cent or 
higher. We also observed the DTP3 vaccination as an indicator to describe 
the functioning of the health system 
Study III Please see below 
Study IV The total number of visits, number of primary visits (first visit during the 
episode of the illness during one calendar year), secondary visits (repeated 
visits which are needed during the episode of the certain illness during one 
calendar year), home visits and visits provided by the nurse were analysed 
 
 
In Study I, II and IV we used data of the whole population and all FDs have 
been involved in the study. In Study III we made a random sampling of the 
FDs. For this longitudinal study we observed P4P outcome results from the 
EHIF database data during one calendar year (01.01.2014–31.12.2014). All 
working FDs in Estonia (N=803) were divided into two groups according to 
their outcome in the P4P (Table 6). For the study we randomly selected 80 FDs 
(10 per cent of all working FDs): 40 FDs (50 per cent) with a good outcome and 
40 FDs (50 per cent) with a poor outcome, proportionally from the cities and 
rural areas, and from FDs with a median size of the patient in their lists. Patient 
lists varied from 1 500 to 2 400. We excluded FDs with big and small size lists. 
To the group of FDs with a good outcome we selected those who achieved more 
than 600 points and to the group of FDs with a poor outcome those with less 
than 200 points in the study period. We selected FDs with a high score and a 
low score to have more differences between study groups. 
Patients with a diagnosis of hypertension and type 2 diabetes (confirmed by 
FDs according to ICD-10) and who had at least three hypertension or diabetes-
related physician visits before the year 2014 were included to the study. There 
were no age restrictions in the study. 
All patients in the study received a unique ID for studying personal level 
data and we counted all patient visits to health care providers (HCP): FDs’ 
visits, all outpatient specialist visits and hospital bed days with selected diag-
noses (all stages of the hypertension and/or diabetes mellitus type 2) during the 
period 01.01.2014–31.12.2014 (Study III, Table 2). 
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Table 6. Number of patients included and/or excluded in the study in Estonia, 2014 
 
 Indicator Number 
Number of FDs with list of patients 803 
Number of FDs included to the study (10) 80 
Number of FDs with a good outcome (480–800 points) (50%) 40 
Number of FDs with a poor outcome (0–200 points) (50%) 40 
Number of patients in the study group 49 841 
Number of patients excluded from the study (3.8%) 1 921 
Patients changed FDs list 1 010 
Patients died during the study period  911 
Number of patients not visited FD within year 1 728 
Number of patients included to the study 46 192 
Number of visits included to the study 172 623 
 
 
A visit was defined as one contact with an HCP – face to face consultation, 
telephone advice or e-mail-based consultation. All these types of visits are 
counted on EHIF invoices with special service codes. 
We counted all visits to the FD and all specialist consultations, numbers of 
hospital days during the study period and all reasons for hospitalisations. We 
selected all patients with all diagnoses of hypertension and/or diabetes mellitus 
type 2 and calculated their mean number of bed days during the study period. 
We have not investigated the number of hospitalisations. 
To understand the possible impact of comorbidity on the visits and hospita-
lisation, we counted the number of different diagnoses per one person in both 
groups (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Comorbidity: Number of different of diagnoses per one person in P4P in 
Estonia, 2014. 
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6.3. Statistical methods 
For all of our studies we used descriptive statistics and the software IBM SPSS 
Statistics 19. For Study I we also used the software R 2.13.1 
The differences between study groups were compared using the non-para-
metric Mann-Whitney U-test, as the data were not normally distributed; if p was 
< 0.05, the difference was considered statistically significant (Studies I–IV). 
 
 
6.4. Ethics 
The Research Ethics Committee of the University of Tartu has approved all 
studies (approval number 162/T-5). 
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7. RESULTS. IMPACT OF P4P 
7.1. FDs and family nurses workload 
During the observation period 2005–2011, the number of FDs participating in 
the P4P increased from 48.2 per cent to 69.2 per cent (Table 6). 
At the same time, the number of all visits in primary care, and number of 
nurse visits, increased as well (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of all visits in primary care in Estonia, 2005-2011 (all primary care 
visits, visits to the family doctor joined to the quality system, visits to the family doctor 
not joined to the quality system, all nurse visits). 
 
 
There was a difference in workload between the two groups. FDs participating 
in P4P had more visits compared to FDs not participating in P4P. In 2006 the 
difference between the two groups was marginal (1.3 times), but in 2011 the 
difference was 4.3 times. 
The number of visits per one FD differs in the two groups of doctors (Table 
7). 
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Table 7. Number of primary visits (9001), secondary visits (9002), home visits (9004) 
and nurse visits (9015) per doctor in two groups of FDs in Estonia, 2005–2011 
Year Family doctors joined to P4P Family doctors not joined to P4P 
 9001 9002 9004 9015 9001 9002 9004 9015 
2005 n/a n/a n/a n/a 861 712 96 77 
2006 1 040 877 116 130 703 605 64 67 
2007 1 059 921 102 214 724 645 55 86 
2008 1 039 923   80 249 591 532 35 80 
2009    987 888   73 277 564 486 31 86 
2010    940 816   56 302 485 396 20 96 
2011    956 868   54 323 452 389 16 106   
 
 
We investigated the numbers of primary visits and secondary visits and the 
tendency was the same – doctors participating in the P4P had more primary and 
secondary visits compared to doctors not participating in the P4P. The number 
of home visits decreased in both groups, but less in the group participating in 
the P4P (Table 7). 
During the observation period 2005–2011, the number of visits per one FD 
was about the same in the group participating in P4P (1 340 visits in 2006 and  
1 355 visits in 2011), but decreased (948 visits in 2006 and 702 visits in 2011) 
in the group not participating in the P4P. An interesting finding was the shift of 
the workload to nurses of those FDs participating in P4P (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of visits per doctor and number of nurse visits in two different 
groups in Estonia, 2005–2011. 
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7.2. Childhood immunisation coverage 
Comparing the two groups of FDs, joined to the P4P and not joined, there are 
significant differences in vaccination coverage in almost all of the vaccinations. 
There was difference in pertussis I and haemophilus influenza I vaccinations in 
2006. In 2012 the difference between the two study groups was not significant 
for several vaccinations (pertussis I, II, III, diphtheria II and III, tetanus II and 
III, poliomyelitis II). The largest difference between 2006 and 2012 was in 
making second and third vaccinations (pertussis, diphtheria, tetanus, poliomye-
litis and hepatitis B) (Study II, Table 2). 
FDs participating in the P4P reached higher levels of vaccination coverage in 
all cases of vaccinations compared to FDs not participating to the P4P, and there 
was an improvement in both groups during the observation period (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Vaccination coverage (%) of all vaccinations (pertussis, diphtheria, tetanus, 
poliomyelitis, hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenza, measles, mumps, rubella) between 
family doctors participating and not participating to the P4P in Estonia, 2006–2012. 
 
 
The diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP3) vaccination coverage rate increased 
during the observation period in both groups, but FDs participating in the P4P 
showed higher coverage rates compared to FDs not participating in the P4P 
(Figure 7 and 8). 
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Figure 8. Two linear regression models to test the hypothesis that FDs joined to the P4P 
reached higher levels (percentages) of vaccinations compared to FDs not joined to the 
P4P in Estonia, 2006–2012. 
 
 
Figure 7. DTP3 vaccination coverage between family doctors participating and not 
participating in the quality system in Estonia, 2006–2012. 
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7.3. The impact of P4P on the number of specialist 
consultations and hospital bed days 
We found significant differences in the mean number of FDs visits. FDs with a 
good outcome provided more visits to patients with all stages of the hyper-
tension (I, II, or III) and for patients with diabetes mellitus type 2 compared to 
the poor outcome group. There was also an increased rate of specialist con-
sultations in the good outcome group by patients with hypertension and reduced 
hospital bed days by both patients with hypertension and diabetes mellitus type 
2 compared to poor outcome FDs (Study III, Table 2). 
 
 
7.4. Number of patients with chronic diseases 
One of our findings is that the number of patients with chronic diseases (hyper-
tension, type 2 diabetes, myocardial infarction and hypothyreosis) increased 
greatly during 2006–2012 (Figure 9). 
In addition, in Estonia FDs should produce a register of all patients with 
chronic diseases, search intensively for preventable risk factors and provide 
counselling and treatment. This means an increased workload and more pres-
sure on primary care team members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 9. Number of patients of family doctors by groups of chronic diseases in Estonia, 2006–2012. 
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7.5. Predictors of a good outcome in the P4P system 
During the observation period 2006–2012, the number of FDs who achieved a 
good outcome in the P4P increased. At the beginning of the study period, only 6 
per cent of FDs achieved a good outcome, but in 2012 a good outcome was 
attained by 53 per cent of FDs (Table 8). 
 
 
Table 8. Number of family doctors achieving a good outcome or poor outcome in the 
P4P system (official results of the P4P system during in Estonia, 2006–2012) 
Outcome 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Good outcome 30 
(6%) 
175 
(39%) 
224 
(35%) 
355 
(52%) 
282 
(39%) 
397 
(53%) 
412 
(53%) 
Poor outcome 470 
(94%) 
277 
(61%) 
418 
(65%) 
323 
(48%) 
436 
(61%) 
358 
(47%) 
360 
(47%) 
 
 
From practice-related characteristics we found the time period of joining the 
P4P to be one predictor for a good outcome. FDs with a longer history of P4P 
more often had good outcomes compared to FDs with a shorter history. The 
number of FDs working in a primary care team had an impact on a good out-
come. At the beginning of the study period (in 2006 and 2007) smaller teams 
achieved a good outcome, but after 2011 teams with more doctors achieved a 
good outcome. 
The number of patients on FDs’ lists had an impact on a good outcome only 
in some years (2010 and 2012), but no impact in other years (2007–2009 and 
2011). 
Regarding the proportion of chronically ill patients in FDs’ lists, only the 
number of patients with hypertension had an effect on a good outcome in most 
of the years (2006–2007 and 2009–2012). The number of patients with type 2 
diabetes, myocardial infarction and hypothyreosis had an impact on a good 
outcome only in single year (Table 9 and 10). 
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8. DISCUSSION. IMPACT OF P4P 
In 2005 all FD practices in Estonia worked with similar principles. Since 2006 
when P4P started, there have been two groups of FDs – participating in P4P and 
not participating in P4P and according to results in the P4P scheme – FDs with 
good outcome and FDs with poor outcome. This gave us a good opportunity to 
investigate the effects of P4P. 
Our studies which aimed to find out the impact of P4P on FDs’ work and 
effects for health care (impact on the number of specialist visits and bed days) 
are one of the few studies in this topic in international literature. 
 
 
8.1. The workload 
We investigated the impact of P4P on workload and found increased workload 
for FDs and nurses participating in P4P. Falzon et al. [158] also found that P4P 
had an effect on workload and work intensification. The explanation for in-
creased workload could be more intensive work and recall of chronically ill 
patients to annual health checks, as well as the more intensive search and call of 
the patients from FDs’ lists to perform activities named in the P4P scheme. P4P 
is based on preventive work (small children immunisations, check-ups of 
chronic diseases and visits to detect cardiovascular diseases) and the role of the 
practice nurse is very important. Since 2013 the EHIF is also funding the 
second nurse in the FDs’ contract and this could help to divide the workload 
between nurses and give FDs more time and attention to chronic and preventive 
care. 
 
8.2. Prevention 
From preventive work we observed childhood immunisations and have found 
that FDs participating in the P4P had better immunisation coverage rates than 
FDs not participating in the P4P. FDs participating in the P4P met the WHO 
criteria in all vaccinations and FDs not participating in the P4P met none of 
them. Several countries include paediatric immunisations in their P4P systems, 
which have had positive effects on childhood immunisation coverage rates 
[137,158–159] and the OECD has included immunisation coverage rates to 
important QIs. [160] In addition, P4P in Estonia includes childhood immu-
nisation rates. Coverage rates for the DTP3 vaccine are used as an indicator of 
how well the health system is functioning. [161] This is because children re-
quire multiple contacts with the health system for full vaccination. [162] The 
total immunisation coverage with three doses of the DTP3 vaccine has been 
sustained at 78 per cent until 2004. One hundred and two countries have 
reached DTP3 coverage of 90 per cent or more and 80 countries are within the 
50–89 per cent range. [163] Estonian DTP3 coverage in 2013 (94 per cent) is 
behind Finland (98 per cent) and Sweden (98 per cent), but at the same level as 
46 
Latvia (94 per cent) and Norway (94 per cent) and better than Lithuania (93 per 
cent). [164] The DTP3 coverage was lowest in Estonia at 1991 (67 per cent), 
increasing stepwise until 2005 (96 per cent) and remains stable until nowadays 
(93–94 per cent). In our study, the DTP3 vaccines coverage rate was better in 
FDs participating in the P4P (reaching almost 90 per cent coverage), but FDs 
not participating in the P4P were below this criterion during the whole obser-
vation period. The explanation for this could be the influence of P4P and moti-
vation to deal more accurately with small children check-ups and immuni-
sations. 
To achieve high levels of vaccination and revaccination coverage rates, FDs 
should combine different methodologies [165] (regular visits, reminders and 
recalling, providing information about the importance of vaccinations and re-
commendations for vaccinations and revaccinations). Achieving target levels is 
sometimes very difficult and FDs should work harder and encourage parents to 
get their children vaccinated at the right time, but this extra work is rewarded 
with extra payment form P4P. 
 
 
8.3. Number of specialist consultations and  
hospital bed days in Estonia 
Several studies have investigated the role of primary care [25–26] and the role 
of P4P to link financial rewards of quality and performance [166] and to moti-
vate FDs for activities to reduce specialist visits and avoid hospitalisations for 
chronic patients. Iezzi et al. [123] showed that financial payment might help 
improve the quality of care and reduce hospitalisations. 
In our study, P4P had an impact on the number of visits to FDs, increasing it. 
P4P has also increased the number of visits to the specialists. It is probably 
because FDs in the P4P system pay more attention to detecting chronic diseases 
in their early stages, and actively recall patients for general health check-ups. 
This increases the number of visits, both of the FDs and the nurses. [85] One 
earlier study showed that the implementation of P4P reduced the rate of spe-
cialist consultations and hospitalisations [124] and we also expected that with 
more accurate monitoring of chronic diseases in primary care we could reduce 
the workload for specialists, but we could not prove it. Another expectation for 
our study was to find out how P4P affects hospitalisations. Caminal et al. [169] 
described the role of primary care as being responsible for preventing hospita-
lisation. This included primary prevention, early detection and monitoring of 
acute episodes, and follow-up and monitoring of chronic conditions. Recent 
studies showed that P4P reduced the likelihood of diabetes-related hospitali-
sations for diabetic patients [127–128] and we have similar findings. In our 
study, hypertensive patients were in hospital for fewer days. However, it is very 
difficult to conclude whether the decreased number of days in hospital was due 
to the P4P. 
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8.4. Chronic diseases 
The National Chronic Disease Strategy states that chronic diseases have clearly 
preventable risk factors, therefore early detection of them is very important to 
reduce the onset, causes, complications or recurrence of disease.[170] Paying 
more attention to detecting chronic diseases in their early stages, recalling 
patients for general health check-ups and immunising children can increase the 
number of the patients in the target groups of chronically ill patients, due to a 
“seek and you will find” strategy, and intensifies the work thereof even more. In 
our study we have found an increased number of patients with chronic diseases 
in FDs’ lists. The explanation for this could be the intensive search of diseases 
mentioned in the P4P scheme and better counting in electronic health records 
(EHR) and EHIF invoices. Sometimes EHR and EHIF invoices are not abso-
lutely correct and there could be some mistakes in ICD coding (double or false 
coding), and this could influence the number of chronic diseases in FDs’ lists. 
In addition, there could be mistakes from specialist consultations and their 
EHIF invoices, when the symptoms are classified as ICD diseases code. For 
example, elevated blood pressure or elevated glucose level are classified as 
hypertension or diabetes. The number of patients with myocardial infarction is 
usually not a result of double or false coding, this number increased as a result 
of intensive search. 
Chronically ill patients are included into FDs’ P4P observation list only if 
the same patient has the same diagnosis a minimum of three times, to exclude 
data entry errors and misdiagnosis. Since 2010 EHIF has collected all ICD-10 
codes from the EHIF database and formed for FDs a list of chronically diseases 
and FDs had possibility to exclude or include patients from or into these lists. If 
a patient is in a FD’s list with false coding of chronically disease (hypertension, 
type 2 diabetes, myocardial infarction, hypothyreosis), it is very difficult for 
FDs to exclude this patient from this list and this could be also reason for 
increased numbers of patients with chronically diseases in FDs’ lists. 
 
 
8.5. Preconditions for good outcome in P4P system 
P4P is an incentive scheme and should motivate all participants to achieve a 
good outcome. [171] For policymakers it is very important to know which 
aspects of P4P could predict a good outcome, save money and have an influen-
ce on health gain. We observed different practice and patient-related characte-
ristics to find out their impact on good outcomes. 
Kelly and Stoye [172] showed that smaller practices are associated with 
poorer quality in primary care services. Single-handed practices have the lowest 
average QOF scores, while large practices (with more than six FDs) achieve the 
highest average scores. We also had similar findings and if we examine our 
study for different practice and patient-related characteristics and evaluate their 
impact on a good outcome, then primary care teams with a higher number of 
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FDs, longer history of participation in the P4P and smaller number of patients 
on FDs’ lists showed better results. Older patients with increased rates of chro-
nic disease and a higher number of patients with chronic diseases on FDs’ lists 
are more typical for a poor outcome [173], which was also confirmed in our 
study. Van den Hombergh and Campbell [174] investigated the optimal size of 
practices and concluded that larger practices can do better. Devlin at al. [175] 
also described that a larger group size is associated with better access and 
comprehensiveness. Gillam et al. [107] showed that group practices have better 
outcomes and patient satisfaction, as well as better continuity of care. We also 
had similar findings, as at the beginning of the P4P, single-handed FDs also 
showed a good outcome, but it seems that over time small teams became 
overloaded with increased workloads (more detected chronically ill patients in 
the list and higher target levels) and did not achieve a good outcome. At the 
same time, primary care teams with multiple FDs were probably able to 
organise their work more efficiently to achieve a good outcome. 
 
 
8.6. Strengths and limitations of the study 
The strength of the study is that we have used the data of the majority of the 
population and all FDs have been involved in the study in Study I–II and IV. 
For Study III we used random sampling. We believe that our sample was repre-
sentative and reliable. 
A limitation of this study can be that the data obtained from the registry 
database can contain some data entry errors and the reliability of the source data 
cannot be checked without conducting a follow-up study. Furthermore, health 
service invoices that are electronically submitted to the EHIF are governed by 
specific rules. Previous studies on data quality in the Cancer Registry and Birth 
Registry have shown that medical data in the registries are reliable. We 
assumed that any inaccuracies were distributed evenly all over the Estonian 
population. Chronically ill patients are included into FDs’ P4P observation list 
only if the same patient has the same diagnosis a minimum of three times, to 
exclude data entry errors and misdiagnosis. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
1.  P4P has a substantial impact on the workload of the primary care team and 
their members: the number of visits increased for doctors (FDs and specia-
lists) and nurses. 
  Although hospital bed days were reduced in some circumstances, we 
could not see the clear effects of P4P on better outcomes for the health care. 
2.  FDs participating in the P4P scheme had better immunisation coverage than 
FDs not participating in the P4P. 
3.  Primary care teams with multiple FDs and a longer history of participation in 
the P4P showed better results. 
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10. SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Perearstiabi tulemuslikkus:  
tasustamise ja praksisetegurite mõju 
Sissejuhatus 
Eesti tervishoiusüsteemi osad on esmatasandi arstiabi (perearstiabi, seaduses 
defineeritud kui üldarstiabi), eriarstiabi (ambulatoorne ja statsionaarne eriarsti-
abi), hambaravi ja ennetustegevus (skriininguprogrammid, koolitervishoid jt). 
Eesti perearstide enamiku moodustavad iseseisvad eraettevõtjad, kellel on Eesti 
Haigekassaga üldarstiabi rahastamise leping. Perearstide leping Eesti Haige-
kassaga on mitmetahuline, hetkel kehtiv leping koosneb pearahast (viis vanuse-
rühma), baastasust, uuringufondist (protsent pearahast), teraapia- ja tegevus-
fondist, kauguse tasust (kaks kategooriat), kvaliteeditasust, lisatasust teise pere-
õe olemasolul ja lisatasust pikendatud lahtioleku korral. 
Perearstide kvaliteedisüsteem (PKS) on süsteemne lähenemine, mille ees-
märk on haigused varakult avastada ja vältida nende progresseerumist esma-
tasandis. PKS Eestis koosneb kolmest osast: haiguste ennetamine (vaktsinee-
rimine, laste tervise kontroll, südame- ja veresoonkonna haiguste ennetamine), 
krooniliste haigustega (teist tüüpi diabeet, kõrgvererõhutõbi, müokardiinfarkti 
ravi järel ja hüpotüreoos) patsientide jälgimine ja täiendavad lisategevused. 
Perearsti kvaliteeditasus osalemine on vabatahtlik, osalemine PKSis suurendab 
perearsti uuringufondi ja hea tulemus (kaks kategooriat) suurendab perearsti 
lepingutasu 2–4%. Iga teostatud tegevus annab perearstile teatud arvu punkte, 
mille alusel makstakse lisatasu. Vähem kui 479 punkti (<75% punktidest) annab 
rahuldava (meie uuringutes poor outcome), 480–539 punkti hea ja 540–640 
punkti väga hea tulemuse (meie uuringutes kaks viimast kokku good outcome). 
PKSid on kasutusel paljudes riikides (Ühendkuningriik (UK), USA, Aust-
raalia, Kanada, Itaalia, Hispaania jt) ja on riigiti erinevalt tasustatud. Kvaliteedi 
mõõtmiseks kasutatakse kvaliteediindikaatoreid, mida võib olla vähe (nt Aust-
raalias 7) või palju (nt UK-s 134). Kvaliteediindikaatorite valik on keeruline ja 
aeganõudev, iga riik on leidnud oma lahenduse. 
Esmatasandi arstiabi kvaliteeti jälgitakse enam kui 30 Euroopa riigis ning 
kvaliteeditasu suurus varieerub riigiti. UK-s moodustab see kuni 25% pere-
arstide sissetulekust, aga teistes riikides keskmiselt 5–10% (Eestis 2–4%), sh 
Itaalias ja Hispaanias 1%. 
PKSile on omistatud hulgaliselt kasulikke omadusi: tervishoiukulutuste pa-
rem jälgimine, vaktsineerimiste kasv, väiksem hospitaliseerimiste arv, vähene-
nud hooldusabi vajadus jne. 
Samas on uuringuid, mis ei ole leidnud nii olulist mõju. On kirjeldatud ka 
negatiivset efekti: raske haigusega patsientidele muutus tervishoiusüsteemi 
sissepääsemine keerulisemaks, sest tervishoiuteenuse osutajatel tekkis tahtmine 
selliseid patsiente mitte vastu või arvele võtta, et niiviisi parandada oma tule-
must kvaliteedisüsteemis. Samuti on leitud, et PKSi rakendamise esimestel 
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aastatel andsid programmilised tegevused häid tulemusi, ent mõne aasta pärast 
saavutati teatud nivoo ja edasist arengut ei toimunud. 
On leitud, et PKS suurendab arstide töökoormust. UK-s tõusis pärast kvali-
teedisüsteemi rakendamist perearstide töökoormus ja tekkis vajadus võtta tööle 
rohkem perearste, õdesid ja administratiivtöötajaid. Perearstid hakkasid tege-
lema keerulisemate haigusjuhtumitega, rutiinsed ülevaatused suunati õdedele, 
kelle töökoormus kasvas seetõttu hüppeliselt. 
PKSi tulemusel on paranenud ravikvaliteet ja vähenenud hospitaliseerimiste 
arv, seda eelkõige krooniliste haigustega (nt diabeet) patsientide puhul (Aust-
raalia). Esimesel aastal suurenes diabeediga patsientidel perearsti visiitide arv 
4% ja eriarsti visiitide arv vähenes 20%, vähem hospitaliseeriti selliseid patsien-
te ka järgnevatel aastatel. On täheldatud PKSi positiivset mõju haiguste enneta-
misele (nt vaktsineerimine, vähi skriininguprogrammid ) (USA; Hudson Health 
Plan). Krooniliste haiguste (hüpertensioon, diabeet jt) jälgimine paranes ja 
perearstide nimistutesse lisandus selliste haigustega patsiente. PKSi haaratud 
patsientidel oli vererõhk ja lipiidide profiil parema kontrolli all, neid oli harvem 
hospitaliseeritud kardiovaskulaarsetel põhjustel (USA). 
Eestis rakendus PKS 2006. aastal eesmärgiga soodustada kvaliteetsete tee-
nuste osutamist esmatasandis, motiveerida perearste tegelema krooniliste hai-
gete ja laste jälgimisega (vaktsineerimine) ja vähendada eriarstiabi vajadust. 
Tänaseks on PKSi juurutamisest möödas juba kümme aastat, saame teha järel-
dusi ja kokkuvõtteid. 
 
Uurimistöö eesmärgid 
Uurimistöö eesmärk oli võrrelda kvaliteedisüsteemiga ühinenud ja mitteühine-
nud perearstide töökoormust (esimene artikkel) ning kvaliteeditasu mõju vaktsi-
neerimisega hõlmatusele (teine artikkel). Kolmanda artikli eesmärk oli leida 
kvaliteeditasu mõju perearstide ja eriarstide töökoormusele ning haigla ravi-
päevade arvule. Neljandas artiklis analüüsisime eri tegureid, mis võivad mõju-
tada kvaliteedisüsteemis osalemise tulemuslikkust. 
 
Uuritavad ja meetodid 
Esimesse, teise ja neljandasse uuringusse kaasati kõik Eestis töötavad pere-
arstid: PKSiga ühinenud perearstid (500 (37,3%) 2006. aastal ja 772 (96,6%) 
2012. aastal) ning PKSiga mitteühinenud perearstid (vastavalt 297 (62,7%) ja 
27 (3,4%)). Kolmas uuring tehti valimi põhjal. Eesti Haigekassasse saadetud 
raviarvete alusel analüüsiti perearstide töökoormust, laste vaktsineerimisega 
hõlmatust, perearstide ja eriarstide visiitide arvu ning krooniliste haigustega 
patsientide (hüpertensioon ja teist tüüpi diabeet) haigla voodipäevade hõlma-
tust. Vaadeldi perearstipraksist iseloomustavate tegurite mõju kvaliteeditasu 
tulemusele. Võrdlusrühmad moodustati PKSis saadud tulemuste põhjal. 
Esimeses töös uuriti PKSi mõju PKSis osalevate ja PKSis mitteosalevate 
perearstide töökoormusele 2005.–2012. aastal. Töökoormus oli määratletud 
kahel viisil: 1) perearsti ja pereõe visiitide arv Eestis uuritavas ajavahemikus, 2) 
visiitide arv perearsti ja pereõe kohta. 
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Arvesse võeti kõikide visiitide arv, esmaste visiitide (esmane perearsti külas-
tus ühe haigusperioodi vältel ühes kalendriaastas), korduvate visiitide (ühe 
haigusepisoodi vältel kõik järgnevad visiidid pärast esmast visiiti ühe kalendri-
aasta jooksul), koduvisiitide ja pereõe visiitide arv. 
Teises uuringus võrreldi PKSis osalevate ja PKSis mitteosalevate perearstide 
nimistutes olevate laste vaktsineerimisega hõlmatust 2006.–2012. aastal. 
Kolmandas uuringus vaadeldi PKSi mõju PKSis hea ja rahuldava tulemuse 
saanud perearstide ja eriarstide visiitidele ning haigla voodipäeva hõlmatusele 
ühe kalendriaasta vältel (01.01.2014–31.12.2014). Kõikidest 2014. aastal Eestis 
töötavatest perearstidest (N = 803) valiti juhuvalikuga välja 80 perearsti (10%), 
kes said PKSis hea tulemuse (good outcome) ja 80 perearsti, kes said rahuldava 
tulemuse (poor outcome). Valim koosnes proportsionaalselt maal ja linnas 
töötavatest perearstidest ja nimistutest suurusega 1500–2400 patsienti. Vali-
misse ei valitud väga suuri (>2400) ega väga väikesi (<1500) nimistuid. Hea 
tulemusega perearstid said PKSis üle 600 ja rahuldava tulemusega perearstid 
alla 200 punkti. 
Krooniliste haiguste korral vaatlesime hüpertensiooniga (kõik raskusastmed) 
ja teist tüüpi diabeediga patsiente; uuringusse kaasasime ainult need, kellel oli 
enne 2014. aastat vähemalt kolm nimetatud haigustega seotud visiiti. Kõik 
patsiendid said unikaalse märgistuse, lugesime kokku iga patsiendi kõik visiidid 
tervishoiuteenuse osutajate juurde: perearsti visiidid, eriarsti ambulatoorsed 
visiidid ja voodipäeva hõlmatuse uuringuperioodil ning eelpool nimetatud kahe 
haiguse korral. Visiidina käsitlesime patsiendi konsulteerimist arstikabinetis, 
telefonikonsultatsiooni ja meili teel nõustamist. Kõik need visiidid on Eesti 
Haigekassa arvetel tähistatud erinevate teenusekoodidega. Uuringus ei vaadel-
dud hospitaliseerimiste arvu. 
Neljandas uuringus otsiti praksisest ja nimistu struktuurist lähtuvate tunnuste 
alusel erinevusi, mis on rohkem iseloomulikud PKSis hea tulemuse saavutanud 
perearstidele. Uuritav ajavahemik oli 2006.–2012. aasta, mille ajal suurenes 
osalejate arv 500-lt 772-le. Perearstid jagati kahte rühma nende tulemuse järgi 
PKSis: hea tulemusega 30 (6%) perearsti 2006. aastal ja 412 (53%) perearsti 
2012. aastal ning rahuldava tulemusega vastavalt 470 (94%) ja 360 (47%) pere-
arsti. Töös vaadeldi perearstipraksiste iseloomustavaid tunnuseid (nimistu suu-
rus, koos töötavate perearstide arv) ja nimistut iseloomustavaid tunnuseid (pat-
siendi vanus, krooniliste haigete arv nimistus). Krooniliste haiguste all mõeldi 
PKSis jälgitavaid haigusi (kõrgvererõhutõve kõik astmed, teist tüüpi diabeet, 
müokardiinfarkt ja hüpotüreoos). 
Andmete uurimisel kasutasime kirjeldava statistika meetodit. Erinevust kahe 
rühma vahel võrdlesime mitteparameetrilise Manni-Whitney U-testiga, sest 
andmed ei olnud normaaljaotusega. Kui p väärtus oli <0,05, siis oli erinevus 
statistiliselt oluline. Teises uuringus kasutasime lisaks kaht lineaarse regres-
siooni mudelit, et võrrelda vaktsineerimisega hõlmatust kahe uuringurühma 
vahel. 
Andmete analüüsimisel kasutasime andmetöötlustarkvara R 2.13.1 (esimene 
uuring) ja IBM SPSS Statistics 19 (esimene kuni neljas uuring). 
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Kõik uuringud olid heaks kiidetud Tartu Ülikooli inimuuringute eetika 
komitees. Seda doktoriväitekirja ja neljandat uuringut toetas Eesti Teadusfondi 
grant ETF7596 „Arstiabi järjepidevus kui oluline arstiabi kvaliteedi näitaja: 
patsientide hinnangud arstiabi järjepidevusele ning järjepidevuse seos oluliste 
tervisetulemitega”. 
 
Uurimustöö peamised tulemused 
Uuringuperioodil (2005.–2012. aastal) suurenes PKSis osalevate perearstide arv 
48,2%-lt 69,2%-le. Samal ajavahemikul suurenes perearstidele ja pereõdedele 
tehtud visiitide arv. PKSiga ühinenud perearstidele tehti rohkem visiite kui 
mitteühinenud perearstidele. 2006. aastal oli erinevus 1,3-, ent 2011. aastal juba 
4,3-kordne. PKSiga ühinenud perearstidele tehti rohkem nii esmaseid kui 
korduvaid visiite. Visiitide arv perearsti kohta oli PKSiga ühinenud perearstidel 
praktiliselt muutumatu (1 340 visiiti 2006. aastal ja 1 355 visiiti 2011. aastal), 
kuid PKSiga mitteühinenud perearstidel vähenes see rohkem kui 200 visiidi 
võrra (vastavalt 948 ja 702 visiiti). Pereõdede töökoormus kasvas PKSiga 
ühinenud perearstidel, kuid ei muutunud mitteühinenutel (esimene uuring). 
PKSiga ühinenud ja mitteühinenud perearstidel oli laste vaktsineerimisega 
hõlmatus erinev. Suurim erinevus ilmnes teise ja kolmanda vaktsineerimise 
(difteeria-teetanus-läkaköha-poliomüeliit ja B-hepatiidi) puhul. PKSiga ühine-
nud perearstidel oli laste kõikide vaktsineerimistega hõlmatus 2006. aastal 80% 
ja 2012. aastal 90%, samas mitteühinenud perearstidel vastavalt 75% ja 80% 
(teine uuring). 
Krooniliste haiguste (hüpertensiooni kõik astmed ja teist tüüpi diabeet) jälgi-
mine suurendas PKSis hea tulemuse saanud perearstide (esimene rühm) visii-
tide arvu võrreldes rahuldava tulemuse saanud perearstidega (teine rühm). Esi-
meses rühmas suurenes eriarstide visiitide arv hüpertensiooniga patsientidel. 
Samal ajal vähenes seal voodipäeva hõlmatus hüpertensiooniga ja teist tüüpi 
diabeediga patsientidel võrreldes teise rühmaga (kolmas uuring). 
2006.–2012. aastal suurenes esimese rühma perearstide arv. Kui 2006. aastal 
saavutas PKSis hea tulemuse 6% perearste, siis 2012. aastal juba 53%. Hea 
tulemusega perearstidel oli PKSiga liitumise aeg (1,90 aastat 2007. aastal; 6,31 
aastat 2012. aastal) ja koos töötavate perearstide arv (2,23 2006. aastal; 5,01 
2012. aastal) ning rahuldava tulemusega perearstidel PKSiga liitumise aeg 
(vastavalt 1,90 ja 5,09), koos töötavate perearstide arv (vastavalt 2,23 ja 3,85). 
Seega, mida pikemalt on perearst PKSiga liitunud olnud ja mida rohkem on 
koos töötavaid perearste, seda paremad on tulemused. 
Patsientide arv perearstide nimistutes mõjutas PKSis head tulemust kahel 
aastal (2010 ja 2012), ülejäänud aastatel (2007–2009 ja 2011) aga nimistu 
suurusel tulemusele mõju ei olnud. Krooniliste haigete arv perearsti nimistus 
avaldas mõju peaaegu kõigil aastatel (2006–2007 ja 2009–2012). Väiksem 
nimistu, rohkem lapsi nimistus ja vähem kroonilisi haigeid annab parema 
tulemuse PKSis (neljas uuring). 
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Uurimistöö tugevused ning puudused 
Uurimistöö tugevus seisneb asjaolus, et oleme kasutanud kogu rahvastikku 
hõlmavaid andmeid ja et kõik perearstid on kaasatud uuringusse (esimene, teine 
ja neljas uuring). 
Puuduseks on, et kasutatud andmebaas võib sisaldada andmesisestusvigu ja 
topeltkirjeid, samuti ei ole võimalik kontrollida andmebaasi usaldusväärsust eri-
uuringuta. Raviteenuste arved edastatakse Eesti Haigekassasse elektroonselt ja 
töödeldakse vastavalt eeskirjadele. Varasemad uuringud Eesti Vähiregistri ja 
Meditsiinilise Sünniregistri alusel on näidanud, et niimoodi saadud meditsii-
nilised andmed on usaldusväärsed. Uuringutes eeldasime, et ebatäpsused on 
jaotunud ühtlaselt üle kogu andmestiku. 
Krooniliste haigustega patsientide puhul on patsient kaasatud PKSi nime-
kirja juhul, kui samal patsiendil on sama diagnoos vähemalt kolm korda, et 
välistada andmete sisestusvigu ja väärdiagnoose. 
 
Järeldused 
PKS suurendas perearsti ja temaga koos töötavate pereõdede koormust. Pere-
õdede töökoormus suurenes isegi rohkem, mistõttu perearsti meeskond peaks 
suurenema, et tööga toime tulla. 
Laste vaktsineerimise hõlmatus oli parem PKSiga ühinenud perearstidel. 
PKSiga mitteühinenud perearstidel oli laste vaktsineerimise hõlmatus allpool 
nõutud vaktsineerimistaset. 
PKS suurendab nii perearstide kui ka eriarstide töökoormust ning ainult vähe-
sel määral vähendab krooniliste haigustega patsientide haiglaravi päevade arvu. 
Kuigi PKSis hea tulemuse saanud perearstide krooniliste haigustega patsien-
tide (hüpertensioon ja teist tüüpi diabeet) haigla voodipäevade arv väheneb 
mõnevõrra, on see muutus tervishoiukorralduslikult mitteoluline; me ei saa kin-
nitada, et see oleks ainult PKSi mõju. 
PKSis saavad parema tulemuse reeglina grupipraksised ja kauem PKSis 
osalenud perearstid. Väiksem nimistu, rohkem lapsi ja vähem kroonilisi haigeid 
annab parema tulemuse. 
 
Kokkuvõtteks 
PKSil on nii positiivseid kui negatiivseid külgi. PKSiga ühinenud perearstid on 
paremini motiveeritud, et saada head tulemust, tegelevad intensiivsemalt kõi-
kide oma nimistu patsientidega, avastavad ja kontrollivad haigusi ning organi-
seerivad tervisekontrolle. Vastukaaluks suureneb töökoormus ja muutub 
praksisesisene töökorraldus, perearstid suunavad krooniliste haiguste rutiinse 
kontrolli sagedamini pereõdedele. On näha, et suurenenud nõudmised vajavad 
suuremat perearsti meeskonda, sest parem tulemus saavutatakse suuremates 
meeskondades (grupipraksistes). Praegu ei ole meil veel kindlat alust väita, et 
PKSis osalemisega oleks võimalik saavutada üldises tervishoiusüsteemis pare-
maid tulemusi. Laste vaktsineerimistega hõlmatus on siin meeldiv positiivne 
erand. 
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